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Abstract 
The balancing of efficiency, effectiveness and democratic control is an ever-recurring 
problem when designing governance structures more or less disconnected from the 
formal democratic institutions. As far as the relationship between these considerations is 
concerned, much of the theoretical as well as the practical discourse revolve around the 
issue of whether synergy emerges or whether there is just a matter of trade-off. By 
applying primarily empirical observations from local-to-local cooperation in some 
Norwegian regions the article attempts to investigate how the relationship turns out.  
The article argues that at least three models are available, one balanced and two 
imbalanced variants. The notion of synergy highlights a model in which input-
processes of democratic participation and output-processes of performance reinforce 
each other. The others, on the contrary, are imbalanced, implying either a democratic 
deficit or a deliberative surplus.  
By comparing the models to experiences from local-to-local cooperation a pattern of 
divergent features emerges. Nevertheless, a trade-off where the regard for local 
democracy and autonomy seems to dominate at the sacrifice of performing efficiently 
and effectively, thus the article is rather pessimistic as to what may be gained by 
pursuing the intermunicipal cooperative strategy further.  
 
 
Hvordan balansere effektivitet og demokrati i interkommunalt samarbeid: Diver-
gerende mål? Å balansere effektivitet og demokratisk kontroll er et stadig tilbakeven-
dende problem når man skal utforme styringsstrukturer som er mer eller mindre frikop-
let fra politisk/demokratiske institusjoner. Når det gjelder forholdet mellom disse hen-
syn, så dreier mye av den teoretiske så vel som den praktiske diskursen seg om man har 
å gjøre med en synergi eller en konflikt (der man må velge det ene eller det andre). 
Artikkelen forsøker med utgangspunkt i empiriske observasjoner fra interkommunalt 
samarbeid i noen norske regioner å belyse hvordan dette forholdet arter seg. 
Artikkelen argumenterer for at det i alle fall er tale om tre modeller, en balansert og 
to ubalansert varianter. Synergi henspiller på en modell der legitimitet knyttet til de-
mokratisk deltakelse, og legitimitet som følge av effektiv problemløsning gjensidig 
forsterker hverandre. De andre derimot er ubalanserte, enten i form av et demokratisk 
underskudd eller et deliberativt overskudd. En utprøving av modellene i forhold til 
erfaringer fra interkommunalt samarbeid rommer sprikende trekk. Likevel synes hensy-
net til det kommunale sjølstyret og den lokale autonomien å dominere på bekostning av 
hensynet til en effektiv problemløsning. Følgelig er artikkelen pessimistisk i sin vurde-
ring av hva man kan oppnå gjennom en ytterligere satsing på den interkommunale 
samarbeidsstrategien.   
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Introduction1 
The article focuses on the challenges of balancing efficiency, effectiveness and 
democratic control in intermunicipal collaboration. Thus it continues the funda-
mental debate on the relationship between input and output legitimacy. Accor-
ding to Scharpf (1999), the participatory qualities of decision-making processes 
loom large as to input legitimacy, emphasizing ‘the will of the people’ and the 
rule of their elected representatives as the fundamental features of democratic 
governance. Output legitimacy, on the other hand, weighs heavily on performan-
ce, and the efficiency and effectiveness of governance in terms of solving collec-
tive problems are in the foreground. Certainly, and as Scharpf claims, both sour-
ces of legitimacy, at least in democratic states, “coexist side by side, reinforcing, 
complementing and supplementing each other “(Scharpf 1999: 12). Neverthe-
less, the relationship between these sources of legitimacy is more complex, even 
when it applies to regional governance, which serves as the empirical context of 
this article.  
Regarding the relationship between input and output legitimacy, more 
scholars are concerned with the ‘democratic deficit’ that may occur in the wake 
of the emergent structures of regional governance more or less decoupled from 
the political democratic institutions (Sørensen & Torfing 2005; Aars & Fimreite 
2005; Andersen & Pierre 2010; Pierre 2011). Hence, a strengthening of the par-
ticipatory qualities of the decision-making process is highly valued; not least as 
regards different kinds of devolved structure of governance; be it on the suprana-
tional, national or the regional level.2 In case the application of networks or part-
nerships is instrumental for the implementation of new kinds of solutions or 
handling problems beyond the capacity of the individual actors (for instance 
municipalities), according to this stance, not only publicity about the process is 
required, but in addition the structures should be accountable to popularly elec-
ted institutions. Further, the leverage of local politicians should not be confined 
to designing and sanctioning the devolved structures; they are also supposed to 
take part in the networks, to instil democratic attitudes and so on (Sørensen & 
Torfing 2005; Aars & Fimreite 2005). Arguments substantiating this view are 
also empirical by providing some evidence of a reinforcing effect of deliberation 
and output legitimacy (Lindgren & Perssons 2010: 463). Increasing the input 
legitimacy not only fulfils standards of democratic accountability and transpa-
rency, the condition for performing effectively is strengthened as well. Thus a 
synergy occurs.  
According to this article, more options have to be considered as to how the 
input and output legitimacy relate to each other in the field of intermunicipal 
cooperation. Obviously, the synergetic variant serves as a normative ideal, 
though not easily implemented in practice. Nor is a trade-off tantamount to 
deemphasising the regard for democratic control for the sake of performing 
efficiently and effectively. A deliberative surplus may emerge as well, implying 
that a commitment to local democracy and autonomy limits the problem-solving 
capacity of intermunicipal collaboration. As argued by for instance Rothstein 
(2009), the output side of governance should be given more emphasis. What 
matters most to citizens is how they are treated and served by political instituti-
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ons (Rose & Pettersen 2009: 274-276; Rothstein 2009: 3253). On this 
background, three models depicting the varied relationship between input and 
output legitimacy are unfolded and put to a critical examination. The following 
research questions are raised: Which features of local-to-local collaboration 
suggest synergy implying that democratic control and performance are mutually 
reinforcing? Thus a balanced relationship emerges. And, on the contrary, which 
circumstances point to models of trade-offs: First, in the sense of de-
emphasizing the need for democratic control and accountability, and secondly, 
by letting democratic deliberation hinder the achievement of effective solutions. 
Last, what seems to constitute the most important challenge in intermunicipal 
collaboration; a democratic deficit or a deliberative surplus? The article pursues 
the analysis in two steps: Firstly, references are made to the formal constructions 
regulating local-to-local cooperation, which aim at balancing efficiency, effecti-
veness and democratic control. Secondly, and most important, the article draws 
especially on experiences from three Norwegian regions, Grenland, Glåmdal and 
Vesterålen, which display the tensions occurring when the formal constructions 
are put to use.  
In comparison with the devolved structures of governance designed or 
emerging on the international level (EU) and the national level commanding 
huge resources, the selected empirical cases for examining the models may ap-
pear rather insignificant. Nevertheless, the loosely connected system of regional 
governance including strategic, collaborative bodies, devolved single-purpose 
organizations, contract networks, and informal policy networks (Feiock 2009; 
Røiseland & Vabo 2008) could be observed in more national contexts and have 
occupied the interest of several scholars (Andersen & Pierre 2010; Feiock 2007, 
2009; Feiock & Scholz 2010; Gossas 2006; Jacobsen et al 2010; Jones 2010; 
Jacobs 2004; Lundqvist 1998, Pierre 2011). Norway characterized by many 
small municipalities, widespread scepticism towards a policy of consolidation 
(Baldersheim et al 2003: 25) and high regard for a sense of local belonging (Bal-
dersheim et al 2003: 57), should stand out as an interesting case, rendering the 
relationship between input and output legitimacy especially demanding. It is also 
interesting to note that criticism levelled at local-to-local cooperation has addres-
sed lack of efficiency in reaching solutions as well as democratic control (Prop. 
No. 95(2005-2006): 60). Thus, intermunicipal collaboration is facing conflicting 
expectations. The dilemma is that strengthening the capacity for institutional 
collective action in order to release synergies in terms of the provision of effecti-
ve services runs the risk of jeopardizing the local democratic process of partici-
pation and decision.  
Certainly, the strategic core, the so-called regional council (regionråd) and 
its working committee composed primarily by mayors of the participating muni-
cipalities, has been instrumental in launching and implementing collaborative 
projects. Although regional variations abound in terms of the volume and the 
content of local-to-local cooperation, the portfolio consists of mostly uncontro-
versial, ‘low-politics’ tasks such as administrative support functions (storage and 
retrieval of geographical information, invoicing and collecting outstanding 
claims, public procurement) and specialized services like refuse collection, fire 
fighting, pedagogical-psychological services, providing assistance to children 
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living in dysfunctional families, casualty clinics etc. (Econ 2006; Vinsand & 
Nilsen 2007). Thus, municipalities seem unwilling to join in collaborative pro-
jects which might encroach on the core jurisdiction of local government (Ander-
sen 2008, 2010; Andersen & Pierre 2010). Not only are functions and jobs jeo-
pardized, but local autonomy and democracy are assumed to be at stake as well. 
The tension with what might be instrumental in solving problems of mutual 
interest and the regard for democratic control is, more or less, permanently 
brought to the foreground. 
 The remainder of the article is structured as follows: The next section out-
lines a theoretical framework for the analysis of the relationship between input 
legitimacy and output legitimacy, and three models of how the relationship may 
turn out are accounted for as well. Then the empirical sources utilized to exami-
ne the models critically, are presented. Here some remarks are made to the case 
regions, Glåmdal, Grenland and Vesterålen, which provide the main basis for the 
analysis, which follows in the next section. The concluding discussion elaborates 
further on this issue of which model captures best the dynamics of local-to-local 
co operation. 
 
Balancing efficiency, effectiveness and democratic control 
The article takes as a point of departure that the balancing of input and output 
legitimacy turns out to be an important challenge to be dealt with when desig-
ning institutions of local-to-local cooperation. Thus it is one-sided to let efficien-
cy and effectiveness serve as the main focus, and to perceive the decision-
making process solely as transaction costs which render mutually advantageous 
outcomes problematic. Proponents of for instance the institutional collective 
action framework have been instrumental in unfolding the dilemmas and trade-
offs pertaining to whether municipalities opt for a collaborative or individual 
strategy in the realm of service provision (Feiock 2007, 2009; Feiock & Scholz 
2010). Valuable insights have been provided as to the varied conditions for per-
forming efficiently, which depend on the problems addressed as well as the 
mechanisms of governance applied (Feiock & Scholz 2010; Steinacker 2010). 
Nevertheless, the proponents of this framework do not make due allowance for 
the issue of legitimacy pertaining to the input side of decision-making, and in 
particular the unique features of political democratic institutions, including local 
governments (Andersen & Pierre 2010). 
Nor is it an option to bring the issue of input legitimacy, solely, to the fore-
ground, and thus depreciate any structure of regional governance unless the 
political principals occupy the driving seat. Ambitious conceptions of democra-
tic governance as for instance proposed by Sørensen & Torfing (2005) and Aars 
& Fimreite (2005), imply cognitive capacity and engagement, which exceed 
what we might expect of politicians, not to mention local politicians. Furthermo-
re, should the comprehensive ambitions contained in their prescriptions be 
feasible, it may easily develop into tight political/hierarchical steering. Deva-
luing the requirements of efficiency and effectiveness is hardly in tune with the 
problems and challenges facing local governments, and in particular municipali-
ties in the Norwegian periphery.  
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Balancing input and output legitimacy: some models 
All this suggests that intermunicipal collaboration as emergent structures of 
regional governance should be assessed in terms of input legitimacy and output 
legitimacy and the relationship between the two. In figure 1 below, I outline four 
different models related to that relationship. Being ideal types they represent 
simplified and pure constructions whose unique features in terms of which emp-
hasis are given to democratic control or input legitimacy and performance or 
output legitimacy. Certainly, processes in real life are complex and incoherent. 
As to whether the input and output legitimacy is low or high, it is hardly possible 
to provide a precise and mutually exclusive definition. The terms low and high 
as far as input legitimacy is concerned refer to a continuum, denoting the extent 
to which local politicians and the municipal councils are involved and having a 
say in strategic issues pertaining to the settling and running of the cooperative 
projects. Although the citizens are the real principals in democratic systems, the 
focus is on elected representatives and their leverage as to input legitimacy. 
Regarding output legitimacy the question of whether the process was instrumen-
tal in organizing projects of mutual interest provides the criteria for deciding the 
degree of legitimacy.  
 
Figure 1: Relationships between performance and democratic control 
Emphasis on 
performance 
Emphasis on democratic control 
High  Low 
High Synergy  Democratic deficit 
Low Deliberative surplus Pro forma 
The figure should comply with the distinction between input and output legitimacy put 
forward by for instance Scharpf. Besides it is my own construction 
 
Synergy denotes a model in which the relationship is balanced. The regards for 
performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness as well as democratic cont-
rol seem to be attended to in a proper way. Crucial in that respect is that the 
municipalities have agreed to organize services which they hardly would have 
managed on their own, but at the same time have designed a structure of gover-
nance which renders the political principals accountable. A mutually reinforcing 
mechanism prevails, meaning that high input legitimacy ensures effective and 
efficient performance, which again increases the support of the cooperative stra-
tegy (see Lindgren & Persson 2010: 453).  
The matter is different as regards the categories democratic deficit and deli-
berative surplus, categories which require trade–offs. Indeed, the logic of trade-
offs may exhibit two divergent patterns. Firstly, and this is a common concern, 
there is the possibility of a democratic deficit. Unfortunately, the notion not 
infrequently serves as a mantra applied to question any form of devolution, in 
which politicians ‘are steering at a distance’. A democratic deficit occurs to the 
extent that politicians leave issues of ‘high politics’ or issues in the core of the 
public domain to devolved organizations which are run by elites not accountable 
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to democratic bodies. Democracy is sacrificed on the altar of performance, or to 
perform efficiently and effectively is more highly valued than democratic cont-
rol. It is, however, premature to claim that a democratic deficit reduces accep-
tance locally, irrespective of how the devolved structures perform. 
Secondly, the trade-off may take the shape of a deliberative surplus. In that 
case, the actors (politicians as well as different stakeholders) though concurring 
on the cooperative strategy as highly valued are still reluctant to proceed further. 
There are everlasting discussions and cooperative initiatives which encroach 
upon the core domain of for instance local government are opposed and ob-
structed, and hence come to nothing. Still, Habermas-inspired researchers insist 
on portraying deliberation as a kind of interaction in which actors give reasons, 
are open to other proposals, and actually yield to the force of the better argu-
ment. The deliberative democracy appears as normative standard for how to 
solve collective problems (see Elster 1998; Rose 2008). Again it must be repea-
ted that the application of the deliberative principle does not necessarily result in 
a ‘win-win’ situation. Although communication may overcome transaction costs 
or other barriers to innovative solutions, it is as Jones shows “just as likely that 
communication will increase the vigor with which participants defend their pre-
ferred solutions” (Jones 2010: 87). Acting strategically, not always for the sake 
of one’s own pay-offs, is generic when it comes to politics. The notion of a deli-
berative surplus means that we abstain from making “heroic assumptions of 
participants” (Johnson 1998: 173), do not exclude partisan and parochial inte-
rests (di Maggio 1988), or avoid conceiving of any deliberative outcome as a 
“reasoned agreement” (Johnson 1998: 176).  
Seen from the perspective laid down in this article, the fourth category deno-
ting a pro forma option or inaction is rather uninteresting. There are, however, 
cases of local-to-local cooperation which have strong features of inaction or 
ritualism (Halkier & Gjertsen 2004: 185). One may question whether constructi-
ons such as these should be identified as partnerships. 
 
Empirical sources 
Different empirical sources are utilized to examine critically the theoretical mo-
dels of synergy, democratic deficit and deliberative surplus. Firstly, the article 
takes the formal rules prescribing the different organizational instruments of 
local-to-local cooperation as a starting point. National authorities have designed 
a varied spectre of formal constructions in order to stimulate inter-municipal 
collaboration. § 27 of the Municipality Act, which has been the traditional legal 
way of regulating intermunicipal collaboration, provides rather few detailed 
prescriptions, and hence gives considerable room for local variations (Jacobsen 
et al 2010: 27).4 The ‘host model’ incorporated in the Municipality Act in 2006 
(§ 28 a, b) is more specific. That applies even more to the Intermunicipal Com-
panies, which are regulated by separate statutes, and limited companies. The 
formal structures surrounding the cluster of partnerships indicate which degree 
of autonomy is assigned to the different organizational tools. National authorities 
have put emphasis on designing formal constructions which attempt to balance 
democratic control with performing efficiently and effectively. Thus, portraying 
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the regulative frame of intermunicipal collaboration serves as the first step when 
pursuing the analysis, and considering the synergetic model in particular.  
However important formal prescriptions of what is deemed appropriate may 
be, they do not suffice when analysing processes. Therefore, and secondly, the 
article investigates how the formal constructions are put into practice. By doing 
so, experiences relating to the politics of intermunicipal collaboration are nee-
ded. In that respect the article utilizes empirical observations based on studies in 
the three, selected regions and other available research. Drawing on empirical 
illustrations is a rather common approach in order to substantiate or falsify theo-
retical assumptions. It must, however, be added that illustrations referred to in 
the article are not accidently selected and fragmented pieces of information. On 
the contrary, the examples serve as critical cases in the sense of putting the men-
tioned models to a test (Yin 2009:48, 49). Thus, they should suggest how likely 
or unlikely it is for the models to occur.  
 As far as the cases are concerned, some remarks are required. The most out-
standing is Vesterålen, though being the smallest measured in population. By the 
end of 2010 the total number of inhabitants in the six municipalities in this regi-
on amounted to only 32 200. The region is situated in the Northern part of Nor-
way, and with the exception of the regional centre, Sortland5, it displays more of 
the stagnating features of the periphery (a declining population). What makes the 
region stand out is its long history of cooperation dating back to the late 1930s. 
In addition, it has developed a broad organizational umbrella, and seen in a nati-
onal comparative perspective it belongs to the category of regional councils with 
the highest volume of activity6 (Andersen 2010). Hence, the region exhibits 
strong institutionalization of the intermunicipal collaboration; though it is hardly 
excelling in the number of operative cooperative arrangements. 
By comparison the formal organization of the regional umbrella in Glåmdal, 
located in the south-eastern part, is as is the case in general a more recent 
phenomenon dating back to the middle of the 1990s. Nor has Glåmdal conside-
red as a region gained the same strong foothold. On more occasions even the 
issue of which is the appropriate name has caused tension among the seven mu-
nicipalities comprising a total number of a little more than 53 100 inhabitants 
(end 2010). Underlying here is the fear that by letting the name of the region 
centre, Kongsvinger, with about 1/3 of the population, be the name of the region 
its already-strong position would be further strengthened. It is also worth menti-
oning that the region is strongly influenced by exogenous processes in different 
superregional labour markets. Hence a considerable share of employees is com-
muting to municipalities outside the region, mostly to Oslo/Akershus, but also to 
other centres in the county (Elverum, Hamar)7. Although the population has been 
reduced as in Vesterålen, the decline is far from as large. In a period lasting from 
1997-2003 the region received resources from a national development grant 
implemented in order to strengthen the capacity regionally to handle restructu-
ring problems. According to an evaluation at the turn of the millennium (in the 
middle of the project period), a great number of projects have been initiated, 
which strengthened the regional identity. Simultaneously, much remains in terms 
of making the performance output more visible (Jakobsen et al. 2001: 355,356, 
362), nor are local politicians in the region unanimous on the question of 
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whether to choose a regional strategy in the field of industrial development rath-
er than a local strategy (Jakobsen et al. 2001: 356).  
First formalized in 2003 as a cooperative project between six municipalities 
the regional umbrella has a short history in Grenland, located in the central part 
of Norway.8 Considering that an intermunicipal power plant was organized in 
the early 1900s it far from tells the whole history of intermunicipal cooperation 
in the region. Seen from this perspective the establishment of the regional deve-
lopment agency,’Vekst i Grenland’, in 1992 appears even more important. Ori-
ginally implemented to cope with problems in the stagnating industrial sector, 
which is, as far as some branches are concerned, an important cluster nationally, 
the agency has gradually targeted community development. The municipal ow-
ners, ‘Grenlandstinget’, function as a board of representatives; but according to 
an evaluation (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008) this renders unanimous steering 
problematic. Otherwise, the evaluation appears positive in terms of achieving 
important goals.9 Contrary to the other regions Grenland is experiencing popula-
tion growth, and since the turn of millennium an increase of nearly 4 per cent to 
117 589 inhabitants. That especially applies to the central municipalities, the 
Porsgrunn-Skien area with a 73 per cent share of the total population.  
Regarding the empirical material referring to the selected regions, the article 
mainly utilizes the interviews conducted among a selection of key-actors as 
sources of information. This category includes mayors, leaders of the secretary 
serving the regional councils, leaders of specific collaborative projects and orga-
nizations, comprising a total of nearly 30. It must also be added that a special 
‘steering group’ including mostly persons from the secretary of the regional 
councils has been a constructive forum for discussing issues relating to the im-
plementation of the project. In addition, the article makes use of some pieces of 
information from a survey targeting municipal council members in all the se-
lected regions (267 members of local councils). The survey generated a 51.5 per 
cent response rate. This source is meant to provide a more general picture of the 
local politicians` perceptions of which tasks are suitable for cooperation and 
which are more controversial, what is gained by pulling together and what are 
the shortcomings regarding the leverage of local councils as well as the problem 
solving capacity of the intermunicipal arrangements. Lastly, available reports 
(evaluations and so on) serve as important supplements. 
 
Examining the different models  
The analysis of the three models is pursued as follows. Firstly, and regarding the 
synergetic relationship, the emphasis is on the different formal constructions of 
intermunicipal cooperation. Important here is primarily how the designing of the 
different tools tries to balance input and output legitimacy in a way which should 
be mutually reinforcing. References are also made to how the organizational 
arrangements are coupled to the local democratic institutions. The tensions inhe-
rent in the structures of governance and not least expressed by the ambivalence 
of local politicians as to what is gained by pulling together prepare the ground 
for discussing whether trade-offs prevail. Secondly, and as regards the two mo-
dels of trade-offs, pieces of information from the survey provide a background 
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for elaborating further on how likely or unlikely a democratic deficit or a delibe-
rative surplus may be. In order to substantiate or falsify the models quotations 
from key informants, critical cases and so on are utilized.  
  
When do performance and democratic control reinforce each other? 
The formal structure of governance including the strategic core as well as the 
operative organizations puts emphasis on balancing the democratic control with 
efficient performance.  
Firstly, the strategic umbrella - the regional council and its executive com-
mittee - is tightly coupled to local governments. Mayors form the members of 
the strategic core and in 2/5 of the 69 councils in Norway the leaders of the op-
position are included (Vinsand & Nilsen 2007). Thus, the governing elites in the 
participating municipalities occupy ‘the driving seat’, which should ensure that 
those in charge are committed to the decisions reached as to which cooperative 
projects are selected. The emphasis on the consensual principle, based on a ‘ne-
gotiated agreement’ (Scharpf 1997) prevents everybody from ‘getting run over’.  
Actually, the settling of priorities as to the volume and content of inter-
municipal collaborations hinges on gaining legitimacy in the individual munici-
pal councils. Furthermore, the formal constructions regulated by § 27 are not 
ascribed any legal authority. A resolution in any of the participating local coun-
cils is required for a task can be delegated. The statutes place, in addition, re-
strictions on which tasks are eligible for delegation, and the exercise of public 
authority in the sense of administrative decisions in individual cases (providing a 
service), unilateral directives, issuing prohibitions and so on is excluded. Thus, 
the formal rules regulating the strategic core, and also some of the operative 
cooperative arrangements, ensure that the local, democratic institutions ‘have the 
last word’. 
Experiences accumulated so far suggest that a restrictive practice prevails as 
to delegating decision-making authority to the strategic core of intermunicipal 
collaboration (Jacobsen et al 2010:59, 63). Indeed, mayors are inclined to refrain 
from initiating collaborative projects which run the risk of jeopardizing the local 
autonomy or, in even worse cases, are perceived to open up for “zero-sum game” 
resulting in costs without any profits, and the loss of functions and jobs locally 
(Andersen 2008 b, 2010). The consensual logic is explicitly expressed when an 
informant in the region where inter-municipal collaboration should have the best 
prospects due to a long history of cooperation (Feiock 2007: 57), reports that it is 
of no use: 
to be creative as a member of the regional council or its working 
committee if one has not gained approval in the local councils. 
The absence of a majority rule implies that the limit is reached when the negotia-
tions fail to bring forth an agreement locally. And when the executive committee 
in the same region convened at the end of 2007 to discuss priorities for the next 
year, it asserted among other things that: 
important issues are approved according to the consensual principle. 
One must be willing to recognize that when reaching agreement is 
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not possible, one has to abstain from launching large and resource-
intensive elucidations.  
 
Secondly, the formal constructions regulating the implementation of specific 
collaborative arrangements are designed, too, to ensure balance between perfor-
ming effectively and democratic control. As to ‘the host model’ (§ 28 a,b) the 
intention of the Ministry has been to provide a legal frame entitling the munici-
palities to initiate collaborative arrangements in the realm of service deliveries, 
involving the exercise of public authority. Not least, the regard for more effecti-
ve and professionalized services was emphasized as this was especially a pro-
blem in small and peripheral municipalities (see (Ot.prop. no. 95 (2005-2006):7, 
58-62). According to the Ministry, re-evaluating efficiency and effectiveness 
boosts commitment among the partners. On the other hand, the model entails 
more formal mechanisms ensuring democratic control. It is a matter of course 
that the local assemblies have to sanction the agreement underlying the applica-
tion of the host model. Moreover, leaving tasks which involve principal issues 
and ‘local judgements’ to a host, requires the establishment of a governing 
board, including members from the participating municipalities. In addition, it 
must be emphasized that the delegating municipality carries the responsibility 
for the services even when left to a host (Ot. Prop. 95 (2005-2006): 58). Therefo-
re, they are entitled to give directives defining standards as well as change the 
decisions and supervise implementation. However, should the local authorities 
resort to a frequent policy of instructing and reversing decisions of the host, the 
efficiency of the collaboration would suffer. It is interesting to observe that in a 
discussion document proposing the Samkommune, the Ministry applies the noti-
on of transferring, not delegating, tasks to the governing board or Samkommune-
styret. The participating municipalities are not, according to the proposal, entit-
led neither to give instructions nor to change decisions made by the governing 
board.10  
In cases where formal constructions like inter-municipal companies and li-
mited companies are utilized, the ties to local governments are even weaker. In 
their capacity as separate legal persons these devolved agencies are responsible 
for their finances and legal obligations. Organizing collaborative schemes as 
devolved agencies, does not mean that local governments abdicate. Firstly, the 
participating municipalities enact the role as a meta-governor by designing the 
statutes and approving any prospective change in the regulative frame. Secondly, 
the municipalities in their capacity as owners may instruct the operative mana-
gement. Compared to what usually is held as the mandate of the general assemb-
ly in a limited company, the board of representatives is entitled to debate on and 
approve budgets and accounts. However, according to Høivik (2005), the diffe-
rences between these formal constructions should not be exaggerated. The com-
pany legislation is flexible, rendering it possible to design the articles of associa-
tion in a way which gives the general assembly a rather broad mandate.  
The picture so far seems rather harmonious; at least the formal constructions 
regulating intermunicipal municipal collaboration appear balanced. Still, and as 
mentioned above, more scholars are pointing to the option of ‘a democratic defi-
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cit’. The survey conducted among local politicians in the three regions may 
substantiate the view of a trade-off, in the sense that 73 per cent consider weake-
ned democratic, popular influence as a disadvantageous feature of this kind of 
regional governance. Considering that a corresponding majority, 72 per cent 
reports a lacking capacity for making effective decisions as well, ambivalence 
over high transaction costs seems to prevail in this issue. On this background, the 
two models of trade-off must be examined critically.  
 
When is a democratic deficit haunting?  
How, based on ’my’ survey, do local politicians conceive of the input aspects of 
intermunicipal collaboration? Does the survey substantiate the view that local 
democracy is ‘on the retreat’? Not surprisingly, as many as 73 per cent of the 
local politicians perceive the mayors to have large/and very large influence on 
the local-to-local cooperation. However, the share, 48 per cent that reports the 
same to be true for the local councils, is still high. On the other hand, the survey 
indicates concern for the local democracy. As many as 57 per cent of the local 
politicians in Vesterålen agree fully/or partly with the assertion that ‘intermuni-
cipal collaboration weakens the control of the local assembly’, though the num-
ber agreeing with this view is lower in the other regions (45 per cent and 54 per 
cent). Apparently, this result may be at odds with another investigation (Jacob-
sen et al 2010: 85), which shows that few local politicians consider that the local 
councils have been ‘put to the sideline’. But as to ‘my’ survey the share agreeing 
fully with the view of a weakening of the local council as a consequence of in-
termunicipal cooperation comprises only 14 per cent in Grenland and Vesterålen, 
and as few as 8 per cent in Glåmdal. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that 70 
per cent when asked to consider important/most important disadvantages of 
local-to-local cooperation, point to a weakened local council. Obviously, local 
politicians are displaying ambivalence in this issue, not least taking into account 
that the same share wants to extend the collaboration.  
 So what with the devolved organizations like ‘Glåmdalsvekst’ and ‘Vekst i 
Grenland’: do experiences from these cases point to a rather restricted variant of 
meta-governance, implying that local politicians` role is confined to sanctioning 
the start up and to approve the articles of association? Otherwise, the companies 
are left to themselves without any say from local politicians? It is important to 
add that since the 1990s national authorities have pursued a policy of devolution 
and, as far as local industrial development is concerned, have put emphasis on 
decoupling this policy field from local government. As to ‘the development 
grant’ made available for restructuring in both Glåmdal and Grenland, the new 
instructions, which were enforced in 1993, required the establishment of a deve-
lopment agency, and the governing board should include members recruited 
from the business community. By that time most of the pioneers among the mu-
nicipalities and regions which had received the grant, had devolved this policy 
field through processes of ‘trial and error’, though in some cases change in the 
political governmental constellations had been an important impetus behind 
adopting a policy of devolution (Andersen & Brattvoll 2000).  
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Later on, in 2010, a sharpening of the rules of legal competence regulated by 
the Public Administration Act is passed. The change in the statuary provisions 
does not forbid popularly elected representatives as well as civil servants from 
being selected as board members of publically owned companies. However, civil 
servants and politicians who serve as board members have to abstain from parti-
cipating in the municipal assembly’s proceedings where the devolved company 
is directly involved. That applies to signing of contracts, changes in statutes, the 
excise of the legal competence to instruct the board of representatives etc (Pro-
posal no. 50 (2008-09), Recommendation from the Parliamentary Committee of 
Local and Regional Affairs no. 92 (2008-2009)). According to investigations 
conducted by Ringkjøb, Aars & Vabo (2008), a majority of local politicians 
express a preference for including politicians in the boards of the devolved agen-
cies, emphasizing especially their function as guardians of public interests. Alt-
hough variations abound, instances where municipalities have made use of their 
formal mandate to instruct the management of the companies do occur (Ringk-
jøb, Aars & Vabo 2008: 62,63).  
Experiences from ‘Glåmdalsvekst’ illustrate how interference from the regi-
onal council and its executive committee may cause a lot of turbulence. What 
actually released a conflict at the end of 2001 was the resignation of the chair-
man of the board, due to what he conceived of as a political overruling of the 
agency. To his surprise he learned that the executive committee of the regional 
council had decided to summon an extraordinary general assembly. Undoubted-
ly, several other issues seemed to have triggered the conflict. In an interview in 
the regional newspaper the chairmen is critical of how a lot of actors including 
the regional council, local executive committees and so on will have a say in the 
matter, suggesting that ‘too many are queuing up to voice their opinion’, and 
hence jeopardizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the restructuring process 
(Glomdalen, 14.12.2001, 3.01.2002). Later on, the manager of the agency fol-
lows up this critique of the politicians (Glomdalen 6. 02.2002). Thus, this case 
illustrates the often delicate balance between political-hierarchical steering and 
operational autonomy, and that the model of a ‘democratic deficit’ far from tells 
the whole story.  
 By comparison, ‘Vekst i Grenland’ appears far more successful. At least the 
agency has survived for nearly twenty years. Originally established to trigger 
industrial restructuring and with an emphasis on the mission of creating new 
jobs, it was convenient for the participating municipalities to ensure that actors 
within the business community were in charge. Their expertise was considered 
indispensable, not only for the purpose of managing the grant offered by Norwe-
gian state authorities and other available financial resources in an efficient and 
effective way, but also in order to gain legitimacy regionally. Though a mayor in 
the largest municipality concedes that he would co-opt critics within the business 
segment: 
I was quite tired of listening to the business sector always emphasi-
zing how badly the political-representative institutions performed in 
matters of economic development. Hence, we let them take the driv-
ing seat. 
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Over the years, the agenda of the organization has been extended giving higher 
priority to projects of community development, a pattern which the trajectory of 
other Norwegian local/regional development partnerships exhibits, too (Ander-
sen 2004; Karlsen & Lindeløv 2003). Prominence has increasingly been given to 
creating an image of a modern region offering jobs beyond the previously domi-
nating manufacturing companies. Thus, the development partnership has addres-
sed infra-structural projects and even issues related to education and kindergar-
ten. Performing this extended role, the agency has gone beyond its original main 
mission of being a tool for industrial development. But as one CEO pertinently 
asks: should a devolved agency be so strongly involved in community develop-
ment and identity creation? According to him, it was quite appropriate to devol-
ve the organization in a situation where 
the agency was preoccupied with conducting negotiations with com-
panies on the brink of bankruptcy. But there is no reason to let a limi-
ted company take care of the marketing of the region. 
Another key informant even calls into question whether the agency has fulfilled 
its mission, but adds that a decision to terminate the organization would be re-
sisted because 
the business sector appreciates much to participate in an organization 
which has large resources at its disposal. 
Certainly, the formal construction of the agency is special as the manager also 
admits: while the municipalities finance most of the running of the organization, 
a majority of the board is recruited from the non-public sector. Some politicians 
find it annoying as well when the agency being mandated to organize and design 
the strategic industrial development plan, points to that  
such-and such decision is hardly in accordance with intentions for-
mulated in the plan. On the other hand, they have allowed us to per-
form a role in this matter, and then we take the liberty to supervise 
the implementation. 
It must be repeated that the aforementioned evaluation recommends an even 
stronger professionalization of the agency, proposing besides winding up ‘Gren-
landstinget’ as a formal body to replace the politician in the board with CIOs, 
and to specify more clearly what should be the focused targets (Pricewater-
houseCoopers 2008). There is an underlying concern for the output legitimacy 
here. Simultaneously, this case as well illustrates the ambivalence prevailing 
among politicians: by settling on devolved solutions which are even given a 
broad mandate, they commit themselves to refraining from interfering in the 
operation of organizations. At the same time, they easily object against being or 
letting themselves ‘be pushed to the sidelines’.  
 
When do efficiency and effectiveness suffer? 
As already noted, 72 per cent of local politicians refer to a lacking capacity for 
decision-making, high transactions costs as shortcomings of intermunicipal col-
laboration. The share which considers the efficiency to be a draw-back displays 
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some variation; it is lower in Glåmdal (66 per cent) than in the other two regions 
(75 per cent and 76 per cent). Although a majority in all regions is satisfied with 
the delivery of services included in the collaboration, only 1/3 report that their 
own municipality benefits much/or very much from the cooperation. Again, the 
survey material calls for caution as to drawing unambiguous conclusion and 
inferring that local-to-local cooperation runs short as far as output legitimacy is 
concerned. Nevertheless, there are features which indicate that a trade-off in the 
sense of jeopardizing efficiency and effectiveness under certain circumstances 
appears rather likely.  
Firstly, by relying on a negotiated agreement as the main principle for sett-
ling issues procedural standards pertaining to input-legitimacy loom large. The 
institutionalization of the consensual practice, however, easily traps the actors in 
never-ending deliberations, rendering non-decisions as well as deadlocks possib-
le. This shortcoming is clearly expressed by a mayor in one of the largest muni-
cipalities in Grenland. While praising the importance of a regional meeting are-
na, he simultaneously questions its capability for settling issues. 
However important it may be to have arenas for discussing issues, the 
authority does not hinge on the dialogue as such. What really matters 
in democracy is the ability to make authoritative decisions, and in 
that respect the collaborative strategy falls short. 
Experiences from more projects suggest that the deliberative qualities of the 
process are not tantamount to producing effective outcomes. In Glåmdal and 
Vesterålen two rather similar and comprehensive collaborative projects were 
launched around the change of millennium. A lot of measures should lend high 
input legitimacy to the projects: the local councils had a say as to the mandate, 
the regional councils decided on the project plan, a selection of mayors and CIOs 
were included in the governing board of the project, a lot of stakeholders partici-
pated in elucidating the different issues. In Glåmdal the different cooperative 
arrangements resulting from the process were dealt with separately in the local 
councils, whereas the local councils in Vesterålen had a common proposal put 
before them. It is a part of this story, that the collaborative project included 
“low-policy” issues like different administrative support functions (invoicing 
and collecting outstanding claims, public procuring), fire protection. Still, the 
projects came to almost nothing; at least the outcome was rather modest. The 
resolutions reached in the several local councils in Vesterålen appeared so diver-
gent that “ it was impossible to proceed further” (Andersen 2010: 20). Nor did 
all of the few positive results of the process in Glåmdal survive for a long time 
(Andersen 2008b)  
To add a further illustration of the obstacles facing cooperative efforts the 
story of organizing an intermunicipal service targeting children living in dys-
functional families in Vesterålen should be especially clarifying. Although sy-
nergies are evident not least as the size and the professional quality of service-
providing organization are concerned, a time-consuming and thrilling process 
preceded the final agreement to get started from 1 January 2012. Since the pro-
cess was formally launched in 2008, the issue has passed through the regional 
council, the local councils several times, working groups or project teams with 
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professionals have been involved, hence the input legitimacy of the process is 
well attended to. Still, unaccommodating ‘grass-root’ bureaucrats preferring the 
maintenance of operative local tiers have opposed the process (see Isaksen 2011: 
66-76). Even the local council in a municipality close to the ‘regional centre’ and 
next to it measured in number of inhabitants, reached a decision with a narrow 
majority. Even though the municipalities concur on organizing the service ac-
cording to the principle laid down in § 28 b, ‘the host model’, assigning Sortland 
the host function in the capacity of having a well-equipped professional staff at 
its disposal, the maintenance of ‘local satellites’ is required. On this background 
one may ask whether the reorganization actually means a significant change 
(Isaksen 2011: 77).  
The consensual practice takes place, so to speak, ‘in the shadow of the majo-
rity vote’ or ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ to quote Scharpf (1997: 47); however 
with the local councils in ‘the driving seat’. A lot of the key-informants are re-
porting rather frankly and clearly that after all the local democracy has ‘the final 
word’, which the accompanying quotations should illustrate: 
Only municipalities are entitled to make decisions. If two municipali-
ties disagree, the issue must be returned. The process proceeds slow-
ly, and, in terms of efficiency, rather badly. 
 
Resources have been invested in elucidating a lot of projects. But 
when it comes to settling the projects politically many are brought 
down. 
 
Cooperative projects addressing for instance administrative functions 
would be advantageous, and we have tried to get started earlier. But 
the local councils gave them thumbs down, not least because the uni-
on officials are protesting. 
 
Underlying these selected quotations there is frustration about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of local-to-local cooperation. As Agranoff remarks in his study of 
public networks (2007), risk aversion easily leads to the consensual kind of 
governance. A strategy of “keeping issues off the decision agenda that are threa-
tening or contrary to consensus building” (Agranoff 2007: 180) prevails. Even 
though a cooperative solution should be preferred measured against economy of 
scale and user preferences, the regard for democratic control has the last word.  
The lowest common multiple is the best to be expected.  
 
Conclusion 
In summing up the analysis of local-to-local cooperation, which implications 
may be drawn? Firstly, the model of a deliberative surplus seems to be the most 
approximate portrayal of how the balancing of efficiency, effectiveness and 
democratic control actually turns out. At least, trading off the output legitimacy 
appears to be a likely option to occur when efforts to embark on a new course is 
initiated. Innovative projects are feasible provided that they do not trespass on 
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the jurisdictional domain of local government. Uncertainty as to what is gained 
combined with a fear of losing control nourishes risk aversion (Agranoff 2007), 
which renders it expedient to draw a veil over issues which could challenge the 
consensual practice (see Gibson & Goodin 1999). In case one tries to lift the 
veil, and attempt to proceed further by deliberation, remarkable transaction costs 
are easily incurred in the decision-making process, and sometimes the negotiati-
ons reach a deadlock. Certainly, one may assert that democracy is time-
consuming, and that inefficiency in settling an issue “might be explained by the 
multiplicity of roles and objectives that these organizations are set in place to 
pursue“ (Pierre 2011: 20). It is, however, doubtful whether this principal argu-
ment applies to local-to-local cooperation, which primarily targets rather speci-
alized services. And on a principal basis more scholars have observed that more 
deliberation is not always to the better, and by being time-consuming delibera-
tions “perpetuate existing practice” (Sunstein 1998: 256)11, that non-deliberative 
elements like passions, self-interests, not infrequently tend to inform political 
discussion (Johnson 1998: 165-167), and that pathologies of deliberation some-
times occur (Stokes 1998). 
It needs to be said that the critical remarks regarding the deliberative princi-
ple is not tantamount to turning down the principle as such, and not to mention 
the regard for democratic control. When it comes to allocating public resources 
and settling on issues belonging to the jurisdiction of local democratic instituti-
ons, local politicians are the obvious principals. In addition, involving different 
stakeholders not only lends legitimacy to the process, but in addition may provi-
de effectiveness in terms of output (Lindgren & Persson 2010). Two reservati-
ons, nevertheless, apply: To proceed further by deliberation does not always 
succeed due to conflicting preferences or an unwillingness to bear the costs of 
what might be beneficial to a broader collective. Thus, the majority vote is indis-
pensable to settling conflicts; but at present this mechanism functions primarily 
as a formal barrier against jeopardizing local democracy, which may serve as a 
pretext for what may be parochial interests (DiMaggio 1988). In addition, as far 
as the role of politicians is concerned, one should not depreciate the appropriate-
ness of ‘steering at a distance’ irrespective of which tasks are being addressed. It 
is not improper to question why politicians should insist on being directly invol-
ved in the governance of tasks, when these tasks are so specialized that they are 
hardly able to provide any substantial contribution to the problem-solving activi-
ty. Performing efficiently and effectively is crucial for any organizational arran-
gement to survive in the long run.  
 Secondly, the pattern of intermunicipal collaboration being portrayed in the 
article is far from unambiguous. Thus, there are features of synergy by designing 
formal constructions which attempt to find a proper balance between input and 
output legitimacy. In addition, there are instances which substantiate how orga-
nizing deliberative processes involving local politicians as well as stakeholders 
have rendered effective outcome possible. Moreover, as Aars and Fimreite 
(2005) remind us, one runs the risk of a democratic deficit when leaving huge 
public resources to a devolved and selected network of elites and in an important 
policy field as for instance culture (Aars & Fimreite 2005). Nor is it unproblema-
tic when a devolved company originally established to finance and assist entre-
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preneurial firms, extends its agenda giving high priority to community develop-
ment as well. Still, if a majority in the local assembly opts for transferring deci-
sions on which projects should be funded or not to a devolved unit, one cannot 
claim that democratic rules are violated. Other options than political-hierarchical 
steering would probably be more suitable in order to comply with a policy of 
community development, and especially mobilizing actors within the business 
community (Andersen 2008a: 73). Even though the option of ending up with a 
rather fragmented structure of devolved single-purpose organizations is not pro-
mising seen from a local democratic perspective, it is like ‘crying wolf’ to claim 
that a ‘democratic deficit’ at present prevails in the field of intermunicipal colla-
boration. 
Thirdly, experiences so far give a rather pessimistic view of what may be ga-
ined by pulling together. The view that local-to-local cooperation should serve as 
an alternative to a policy of consolidation is hardly fulfilled. Certainly, some 
fruits have been reaped. But much remains unsettled. Obviously, it is demanding 
to gain acceptance for a collaborative strategy within core domains like primary 
education and elderly care. Less than 1/3 of the local politicians perceive these 
as well suited for partnering. That is puzzling considering that more municipali-
ties, especially in peripheral districts, are hardly sufficiently robust, economical-
ly as well as professionally, to meet the increasing requirements of service provi-
sion. The ‘Samhandlingsreform’, targeting improvements in how the special 
branches (somatic and psychiatric hospitals) and the primary health care com-
municate and transact with each other, would in particular have implications for 
how the care for elderly and other vulnerable clients (diabetics) is organized 
locally (see Report no. 47; Recommendation from the Parliamentary Committee 
of Health and Care Services 212, 2009-2010). An implementation of this re-
form12 leaves no other option than cooperation if a comprehensive amalgamation 
is to be avoided. 
On the other hand, the delivery of services like for instance elderly care is 
not only a matter of organizing solutions of high quality. Important as well is the 
local accessibility of the services (Gossas 2006). Taking into account the decen-
tralized pattern of settlement, the long geographical distances and so on in Nor-
way it remains uncertain what might be gained by voluntary cooperation or a 
policy of imposed consolidation as to the service deliveries unless the require-
ments of accessibility are weakened. This dilemma is, probably, best handled 
within the frame of local democratic institutions rather than leaving them to 
more or less decoupled cooperative bodies. On this background one may ask 
whether the challenges first and foremost revolve round the issue of designing 
more robust municipalities than to pursue further the experimental, time-
consuming and unsure track of voluntary cooperation.  
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1 The article forms part of the publications from the project “Strategic regions between efficiency and 
democratic governance”, organized under the umbrella of the programme: Democratic Governance 
in Regional Contexts. The project has been financed by the Norwegian Research Council, and it was 
implemented during the period 2007-2009. The project team included Arild Gjertsen, Bjarne Linde-
løv, Jon Pierre and the author of this article. The notion of strategic regions is elaborated in another 
article (Andersen & Pierre 2010), referring just to the cluster of partnerships which has emerged 
between the municipal and county level of the political/administrative system of governance. In this 
article, the terms local-to-local cooperation or intermunicipal collaboration are applied to denote 
this system of regional governance (in Norwegian ‘interkommunalt samarbeid’ and in Swedish 
‘mellankommunalt samarbete’). Regarding the terms efficiency and effectiveness the usual meanings 
are applied: Efficiency is defined as productivity, which indicates whether a service “is delivered 
with the minimum of waste “(Flynn 2002: 222). Effectiveness, on the other hand, has a broader 
meaning, including the quality of a service, and its contribution to over-arching goals (Flynn 2002: 
222). It must be added that the article draws on previous publications from the project; especially 
Andersen 2008, Andersen 2010 and Andersen & Pierre 2010.  
A previous draft of this article has been presented at a seminar, May 2010, organized by the section 
of Political Science and Organization; Faculty of Social Sciences/University of Nordland. I have 
received comments from colleagues and others. I will especially thank Anders Lidström, Jon Pierre, 
and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive remarks. In addition, Kjetil Enstad has contri-
buted much to improving the manuscript linguistically. In that respect thanks to Knut Olav as well 
for his advices.  
2 As to the term devolution the article applies the meaning put forward by Grønlie & Selle (1998), 
which refers to  processes of autonomization of the operative agent .  According to them, the auto-
nomization can take part within the public umbrella (‘internal devolution’), leaving more space for 
the agent to make independent decisions.  ‘The host model’ may serve as an example in the sense of 
delegating to one municipality (the host) the operational responsibility for the providing of a service. 
However, the delegating municipalities nevertheless bear the main responsibility, and they are entit-
led to instruct the host etc. Devolution may go beyond that and assign the operational unit a separate 
legal status (‘external devolution’). In that case the service-providing organization stands on its own 
feet, being responsible for its income, expenses and so on. Intermunicipal companies and the special 
district model (Samkommune) are examples of an external devolution.   
3 Rothstein’s discussion of what constitutes the quality of government, with an emphasis on how it 
performs has been inspiring. His focus is especially on the significance of fairness and impartiality in 
serving the citizens (see also Rothstein & Teorell 2008), and the empirical references are national 
political systems. Rose and Pettersen, on the contrary, are preoccupied with the legitimacy of local 
democratic institutions. What matters most seem to be how well the service provision matches the 
preferences of citizens. This does not mean, according to them, that provided citizens are satisfied 
with the provision of services, they do not care for local democracy as such.   
4 § 27 of the Municipality Act has, according to Jacobsen et al., been given a broad application, 
regulating both the strategic core (the regional councils) as well as some operative arrangements of 
cooperation (administrative support functions, service providing units). Although this legal con-
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struction is frequently in use, the cognitive understanding of the statuary provision is rather unclear 
(Jacobsen et al 2010: 40).  
5 Sortland’s development is exceptional, and for instances since the millennium the increase in 
population amounts to 7.4 %. (to 9819). This means that about 1/3 of the inhabitants in the region 
lives in this municipality.   
6 In 2008 10-12 man-labour years were attached to the regional umbrella, the regional council and 
the different committees (targeting recreation, culture, tourism and the development of qualification). 
The average income since 2003 amounts to about 11 million Norwegian kr. (Andersen 2010).  
According to a registration by Vinsand & Nilsen only 9 % of the 69 regional councils had income 
amounting to over 10 million Norwegian kr. Most of the regional councils have a rather modest 
activity, and as many as 61 % report in 2006 to have an income of two million Norwegian kr. or less  
to pay for the secretary, projects and so on (Vinsand & Nilsen 2007).  
7 In 2007 22 % of the employees (or 5608) commuted to another municipality outside the region. 
8 As late as in 2006 the project organization was made permanent, regulated by § 27. The strategic 
core of the ‘Grenlandssamarbeidet’ is not confined to the political and administrative leadership of 
the municipalities.  A separate assembly, ‘regionting’, comprising the executive committees of the 
participating municipalities, enact the role as a board of representatives. 
9 The agency can be classified as an operative development partnership. Today the running of the 
agency is financed by contributions from the owner municipalities. The projects initiated by the 
organization are supported financially by the return of funds at the agency’s disposal. During the 
period 2003-2008 the expenses of the owners amounted to 50 million Norwegian kr. 
10 In connection with the revision of the Municipal Act in 2006 national authorities considered to 
give the model of Samkommune a legal status.  On this occasion, however, one settled on incorpora-
ting statuary provisions regulating the host model. A project targeting the ‘Samkommune’ has been 
implemented during the period 2004-2007. An evaluation is available, systematizing the experiences 
from the project (Sand, Aasetre & Lysø 2007). The implementation of the ‘Samhandlingsreform’  
undoubtedly requires more obligatory kinds of intermunicipal cooperation. The reintroduction of the 
proposal must be seen in this reform context.   
11 It must be added that Sunstein is sympathetic to deliberative democracy. He has faith in institut-
ional solutions to avoid regulation of health risks, which is addressed in his chapter (Elster 1998), 
resulting in trade-offs making us worse off. 
12 The reform was debated in Parliament in April 2010. Some members of the National Assembly 
claimed that larger and more robust municipalities were required in order to implement the reform. 
The Cabinet has decided to implement the reform from 1 January 2012. 
